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time affects the frequency of task
confusions in task switching
Marco Steinhauser* and Miriam Gade
Department of Psychology, Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany
When participants rapidly switch between tasks that share the same stimuli and
responses, task confusions (i.e., the accidental application of the wrong task) can occur.
The present study investigated whether these task confusions result from failures of
endogenous control (i.e., from ineffective task preparation) or from failures of exogenous
control (i.e., from stimulus-induced task conflicts). The frequency of task confusions
was estimated by considering the relative proportion of distractor errors, that is, errors
that result when participants erroneously respond to the distractor associated with the
alternative task. In Experiment 1, the efficiency of exogenous control was manipulated
by varying the temporal order of target and distractor presentation. In Experiment 2,
the efficiency of endogenous control was manipulated by varying the time available for
preparing the task in advance. It turned out that only the efficiency of exogenous control
but not the efficiency of endogenous control influenced the proportion of distractor errors.
Accordingly, task confusions are more related to failures in exogenous control.
Keywords: errors, task switching, task preparation, cognitive control, error detection
INTRODUCTION
Current theories on cognitive control assume that goal-directed behavior is achieved by controlling
the task set. While task set refers to a configuration of the cognitive system that allows for
executing a certain task, task-set control denotes the process by which task sets are selected and
implemented. Task-set control can occur endogenously, when control processes reconfigure the
cognitive system according to current goals and intentions (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran,
1996), but also exogenously, when external stimuli activate a task set according to acquired stimulus-
task associations (e.g., Steinhauser and Hübner, 2007, 2009; Yamaguchi and Proctor, 2011). In the
present study, we investigated how failures in task-set control can lead to task confusions, i.e., to
the accidental execution of the wrong task. More specifically, we asked whether task confusions are
due to failures of endogenous control, exogenous control, or both. An answer to this question can
provide valuable information about control processes involved in task-set control.
Task-set control is typically investigated using the task-switching paradigm (Kiesel et al., 2010),
which requires multiple tasks to be performed in random or pre-specified order.When performance
on task-switch trials is compared with that on task-repetition trials, then so-called switch costs
are observed, which are assumed to reflect task-set reconfiguration (Rogers and Monsell, 1995;
Meiran, 1996; Oberauer et al., 2013) but also memory processes like priming or associative
strengthening of tasks (Allport et al., 1994; Meiran, 2000; Schuch and Koch, 2003; Steinhauser
and Hübner, 2006; Philipp et al., 2007). Evidence for the occurrence of task confusions came from
studies showing that performance after errors is better for task switches than for task repetitions
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(Steinhauser and Hübner, 2006, 2008; Steinhauser, 2010; Desmet
et al., 2012). This can be explained by assuming that some of these
errors are due to task confusions, which turn a subsequent task
switch into a task repetition, and vice versa. Moreover, a recent
study revealed dissociable neural correlates of task confusions and
response confusions (Desmet et al., 2011).
The question arises how these task confusions emerge.
Basically, there are two possible sources which are related to the
two types of control mentioned above: First, a task confusion can
occur because endogenous control has failed, for instance, because
the wrong task set is retrieved during preparation (Altmann and
Gray, 2008; Oberauer et al., 2013) or the control system fails to
engage in endogenous reconfiguration (De Jong, 2000). Second, a
task confusion can occur because exogenous control has failed,
that is, because the stimulus activated the wrong task set, for
instance, because irrelevant stimulus features associated with the
wrong task capture attention (Steinhauser and Hübner, 2007,
2009) and therefore trigger instantaneous task-set retrieval from
memory (Yamaguchi and Proctor, 2011).
To determine the source of task confusions, it would be
necessary to directly measure the frequency of task confusions.
Oneway to achieve this is to use non-overlapping response sets. In
a recent study, Meiran and Daichman (2005) assigned a different
hand to each task, and measured the frequency of task confusions
by considering the number of hand confusions. Their results
suggested that task confusions are influenced by preparation time,
which implies that they are due to failures of endogenous control.
However, it is not clear whether hand confusions are really due to
task confusions, or whether they simply reflect failures in motor
preparation. In a further step, Meiran and Daichman (2005)
confirmed their results for tasks with overlapping responses using
multinomial modeling. Their modeling results showed that a
short preparation time led to a large frequency of task confusion
on task switches while this was considerably reduced with a
long preparation time. However, conclusions from multinomial
models depend strongly on implicit theoretical assumptions, like,
e.g., the statistical independence of latent events (e.g., Chen et al.,
2015).
To overcome these problems, the present study made use
of a novel method. We developed a three-choice paradigm in
which task confusions and response confusions were differentially
associated with different error types. Whereas one task consisted
of classifying a symbol as number, letter, or non-alphanumeric
character (e.g., %), another task consisted of classifying a picture
as fruit, vehicle, or animal. Each response key was assigned to
one category for each task (e.g., the left key was pressed for
animal and letter). The stimuli consisted of a target associated
with the relevant task and a distractor associated with the
irrelevant task, but only stimuli were used for which target and
distractor were associated with different responses. This allowed
for distinguishing between two types of errors (see also Maier
et al., 2012; Maier and Steinhauser, 2013): Participants could
erroneously press the key associated with the distractor (distractor
error) or the key associated with neither the target nor the
distractor (non-distractor error).
Crucially, the relative proportion of distractor errors (among
all errors) can serve as a correlate of the frequency of task
confusions. If only the response is confused (while the correct
task set is applied), this should equally often lead to a distractor
error and a non-distractor error. If, however, the task is confused
(and the correct response for that task is produced), this should
always lead to a distractor error. This implies that the relative
proportion of distractor errors is positively correlated with the
relative proportion of task confusions. As a consequence, although
the frequency of task confusions cannot be exactly estimated
in this way, the proportion of distractor errors should be a
meaningful correlate of this frequency, and thus, can be used to
measure the susceptibility to task confusions in a condition.
In two experiments, this rationale was used to investigate
whether task confusions are related to failures of endogenous
task-set control or to failures of exogenous task-set control.
To this end, it was examined whether manipulations of the
efficiency of each control type affects the susceptibility to task
confusions. In Experiment 1, the efficiency of exogenous control
was manipulated by varying the temporal order in which the
target and the distractor appeared. In Experiment 2, the efficiency
of endogenous control was manipulated by varying the time for
preparing the task in advance. If task confusions were due to
failures of exogenous task-set control, the relative proportion of
distractor errors should depend on the efficiency of exogenous
task-set control. Similarly, if task confusions were due to failures
of endogenous control, the relative proportion of distractor errors
should depend on the efficiency of endogenous control. Of course,
both predictions could hold because both assumptions are not
mutually exclusive.
In addition, we were interested in the detectability of errors
that result from task confusions. In one experiment, Steinhauser
and Hübner (2006) required participants to signal their errors by
pressing a neutral signaling key whenever they detected an error.
It turned out that even detected errors lead to switch benefits
on the subsequent trial. Although this implies that errors due to
task confusions are principally detectable, one could hypothesize
that error detection is harder for these errors than for errors
due to response confusions. Current theories on error detection
assume that errors are detected because the correct response
becomes activated after an error has occurred (Yeung et al.,
2004; Steinhauser et al., 2008). This should be more difficult
when the error is due to task confusion, because activating the
correct response requires that first the correct task is activated.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that distractor errors should be less
detectable than non-distractor errors.
EXPERIMENT 1
Studies on selective attention have shown that presenting a target
feature prior to a distractor feature increases the probability that
the distractor feature activates a response (Glaser and Glaser,
1982). The same should hold for the task. The relevant task set
should be activated more strongly by the stimulus when the target
appeared first, whereas the irrelevant task set should be activated
more strongly when the distractor appeared first. Accordingly,
target-distractor order can be used to manipulate the efficiency of
exogenous task-set control. If the efficiency of exogenous control
influences the susceptibility to task confusions, the proportion of
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distractor errors should be increased when the distractor appears
first.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-two participants (15 female) between 19 and 28 years
of age (mean 21.9) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
participated in the experiment. Participants were recruited at
the University of Konstanz and were paid 7 Euro per hour.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki and the guidelines of the ethics committee at the
University of Konstanz, and informed consent was acquired from
all participants.
Apparatus
The stimuli were presented on a 21-inch color monitor. An IBM-
compatible PC controlled stimulus presentation and response
registration.
Stimuli
Each stimulus consisted of a character and a picture presented
horizontally arranged. The set of characters consisted of four
letters (A, B, C, D), four numerals (1, 2, 3, 4), and four symbols
($, %, &, ?), taken from Arial font. The set of pictures consisted of
four animals (bird, cat, dog, mouse), four fruits (apple, banana,
cherry, pear), and four vehicles (aircraft, bike, car, sailboat),
taken from the Snodgrass-Vanderwart Set of Standardized
Pictures (Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980). Only characters
and pictures were combined that were associated with different
responses (i.e., incongruent stimuli). These combinations were
realized in each possible order (left/right). Moreover, because
the two stimulus parts faded in asynchronously on the screen,
each stimulus was realized with the picture appearing first
or with the character appearing first. Altogether, this resulted
in 384 stimuli. A circle and a square were used as cues.
Cues and stimuli were presented in white color on a black
background.
Design and Procedure
On each trial, participants had to apply one of two judgments.
For the character judgment, the character in the stimulus had to
be classified as “letter,” “numeral,” or “symbol.” For the picture
judgment, the picture in the stimulus had to be classified as
“animal,” “fruit,” or “vehicle.” Responses were given with the right
hand by pressing the “arrow left” key with the index finger for
the categories “letter” and “animal,” the “arrow down” key with
the middle finger for the categories “numeral” and “fruit,” or the
“arrow right” key with the ring finger for the categories “symbol”
and “vehicle.” In addition, participants were required to signal
their errors. They were instructed to press the space bar with their
left hand whenever they think that their first response was an
error.
Each trial started with the presentation of the cue for 300 ms
followed by a blank screen for 900ms. Then, the first stimulus part
(target or distractor stimulus) appeared. After a delay of 100 ms,
the second stimulus part appeared. The full stimulus remained on
the screen for 150ms followed by a blank screen. 1000ms after the
response, a new trial started. If a signaling response or a correction
response occurred during this interval, a new interval of 1000 ms
was started. No feedback on the accuracy of the response was
provided.
Participants worked through six test blocks of 144 trials,
resulting in a total amount of 864 trials. Within each block, the
sequence of tasks (character vs. picture) was randomized. Four
practice blocks of 72 trials preceded the test blocks. In the first
practice block, the task rules were learnt without time pressure. In
the second practice block, participants were instructed to respond
as fast as possible. At the end of this and the following blocks,
participants were encouraged to respond more quickly when the
error rate dropped below 15%. In the third practice block, error
signaling was introduced.
Results
Trials were classified according to whether the response
corresponded to the target (correct), the distractor (distractor
errors) or none of the stimulus elements (non-distractor error).
For the analysis of response times (RT), trials were excluded with
RTs deviating more than three standard deviations from themean
computed for each condition and participant.
RTs and Error Rates
Response times of correct responses and error rates were
analyzed in a two-way ANOVA with repeated measurement on
the variables Task Transition (task switch, task repetition) and
Stimulus Order (target first, distractor first). The results are
presented in Figure 1, left panel. In the RTs, a significant main
effect of Task Transition was obtained, indicating significant
switch costs (88 ms), F(1,21) = 26.9, p < 0.001. The effect of
Stimulus Order was only marginally significant, F(1,21) = 4.18,
p < 0.06. RTs were shorter when the distractor appeared first
(741 ms) than when the target appeared first (774 ms). In
the error rates, Task Transition as well as Stimulus Order
reached significance. There were significant error switch costs
(3.3%), F(1,21) = 16.5, p < 0.001, and the error rate was
larger when the distractor appeared first (17.5%) as compared
to when the target appeared first (11.8%), F(1,21) = 7.28,
p< 0.05.
Proportion Distractor Errors
The relative proportion of distractor errors (among all errors)
was analyzed in a similar analysis (see, Figure 2, left panel).
The mean proportion of distractor errors was 60.1%, which was
significantly above 50%, t(21) = 6.78, p < 0.001. The main
effect of Stimulus Order reached significance, F(1,21) = 5.67,
p < 0.05. The proportion of distractor errors was increased when
the distractor appeared first (63.7%) as compared to when the
target appeared first (56.5%). The main effect of Task Transition
was only marginally significant, F(1,21) = 3.56, p < 0.07. The
proportion of distractor errors was slightly increased on task
switches (61.9%) as compared to task repetitions (58.3%). The
interaction between Task Transition and Stimulus Order was not
significant (F<1).
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FIGURE 1 | RTs and error rates in Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of
Task Transition, Stimulus Order (Experiment 1), and Cue-Stimulus
Interval (Experiment 2). Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Rep, repetition; Swi, Switch; ms, milliseconds.
FIGURE 2 | Proportion of distractor errors in Experiment 1 and 2 as a
function of Task Transition, Stimulus Order (Experiment 1), and
Cue-Stimulus Interval (Experiment 2). Error bars represent standard errors
of the mean. Rep, repetition; Swi, Switch; ms, milliseconds.
Error Signaling
One participant had to be excluded from the analysis of
signaling latencies due to a low number of signaled errors.
The relative frequency of signaled errors (among all errors) as
well as the signaling latency (i.e., the time between the first
response and the signaling response) was compared between
distractor errors and non-distractor errors. Distractor errors
were signaled less frequently (63.3%) than non-distractor errors
(75.5%), F(1,21) = 23.2, p < 0.001. Moreover, signaling latencies
were significantly longer for distractor errors (618 ms) than for
non-distractor errors (546 ms), F(1,20) = 8.53, p< 0.05.
Discussion
The fact that the proportion of distractor errors exceeded 50%
shows that a substantial number of distractor errors were due
to task confusions. If only response confusions had occurred,
then each of the two wrong alternative responses should be
equally frequent, leading to a proportion of 50% for each error
type. Most important, however, the data indicate that stimulus
order influenced the proportion of distractor errors, and thus, the
susceptibility to task confusions. When the distractor appeared
first, not only the error rate was increased but also the proportion
of distractor errors. These results clearly support the view that
the susceptibility to task confusion is affected by the efficiency of
exogenous control, that is, by the efficiency with which target and
distractor can activate their associated tasks (see Yamaguchi and
Proctor, 2011; Schneider, 2015; for recent discussion of such rapid
task-set activation). A somewhat unexpected result is the trend
toward shorter RTs when the distractor appeared first. This could
reflect that the early distractor occasionally elicits a fast guess that
is sometimes correct. This further shows that target-distractor
order is a viablemethod tomanipulate exogenous task-set control.
Finally, we were interested in the detectability of the two error
types. As predicted, non-distractor errors were detected more
frequently and more quickly than distractor errors.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 investigated whether task confusions also result
from failures of endogenous control. Endogenous control was
manipulated by varying preparation time. Previous studies have
shown that a short preparation time leads not only to a generally
impaired performance, but also to increased switch costs in error
rates and RTs (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996). It was
hypothesized that, if the efficiency of endogenous task-set control
influences the susceptibility to task confusions, the proportion of
distractor errors should be increased when preparation time is
short (Meiran and Daichman, 2005).
Materials and Methods
Twenty new participants (17 female) between 18 and 25 years
of age (mean 21.1) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
participated in the study. Design and procedure of the experiment
was the same as in Experiment 1 with the following exceptions.
The cue was shown for 200 ms only. The cue-stimulus interval
(CSI) was either 300 ms (short CSI condition) or 1000 ms (long
CSI condition), and varied randomly within each block. The
stimulus parts appeared synchronously and remained on the
screen for 150 ms. The interval between the last response and the
new cue was 1000 ms in the long CSI condition and 1700 ms in
the short CSI condition.
Results
RTs and Error Rates
Response times of correct responses and error rates were entered
into a two-way ANOVA with repeated measurement on the
variables Task Transition (task switch, task repetition), and CSI
(long, short). The results are shown in Figure 1, right panel. For
the RTs, significantmain effects of Task Transition, F(1,19)= 65.6,
p < 0.001, and CSI, F(1,19) = 66.1, p < 0.001, as well as a
significant interaction between both variables, F(1,19) = 7.06,
p < 0.05, was obtained. The switch costs were larger with a
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short CSI (118 ms) than with a long CSI (72 ms). For the error
rates, significant main effects of Task Transition, F(1,19) = 67.5,
p< 0.001, andCSI, F(1,19)= 12.8, p< 0.01, as well as a significant
interaction between both variables, F(1,19) = 8.66, p < 0.01, was
obtained, indicating that the switch costs were larger with a short
CSI (7.2%) than with a long CSI (3.7%).
Proportion Distractor Errors
The mean proportion of distractor errors was 60.4%. This
was significantly above 50%, t(19) = 6.26, p < 0.001, but
not significantly different from the mean of Experiment 1,
F(1,40) = 0.03, p = 0.87. A similar ANOVA revealed only a
significant main effect of Task Transition (see, Figure 2, right
panel), F(1,19) = 6.35, p < 0.05. The proportion of distractor
errors was increased for task switches (62.7%) as compared to task
repetitions (58.1%). However, neither a significant effect of CSI
nor a significant interaction was obtained (Fs<1).
Error Signaling
Again, the relative frequency of signaled errors (among all
errors) and the latency of the signaling response was compared
between non-distractor errors and distractor errors. Distractor
errors (63.4%) were signaled less often than non-distractor errors
(71.0%), F(1,19) = 11.5, p < 0.01. Signaling latencies were longer
for distractor errors (652 ms) than for non-distractor errors
(583 ms), F(1,19) = 8.75, p< 0.01.
Discussion
Manipulating preparation time influenced performance in the
expected direction. Decreasing preparation time led to increased
RTs and error rates as well as to increased switch costs. However,
the relative proportion of distractor errors was not affected by
a reduced preparation time. This indicates that the additional
errors due to a shorter preparation time were mainly response
confusions. If these errors were task confusions, this would have
led to an increased proportion of distractor errors among all
errors. Because only response confusions were induced by a
shorter preparation time, the same number of non-distractor
errors and distractor errors was added which did not change
the proportion of distractor errors. Accordingly, manipulating
the efficiency of endogenous control seems to have no effect at
all on the susceptibility to task confusions. Finally, the analysis
of error signaling performance supported the results from the
first experiment. Again, non-distractor errors were detected more
frequently and more quickly than distractor errors.
A potential problem for the interpretation of our results is that
our conditions differ with respect to target duration. While the
target is presented for 150 ms in Experiment 2, it is presented for
250ms in the target-first condition of Experiment 1 but for 150ms
in the distractor-first condition of Experiment 1. The question
emerges whether these differences in target duration alone can
account for differences in the proportion of distractor errors
across conditions. In this case, one would expect that the mean
proportion of distractor errors from Experiment 2 differs only
from the target-first condition from Experiment 1, but not from
the distractor-first condition from Experiment 1. However, our
data speak against such an interpretation. The mean proportion
from Experiment 2 (60.4%) lies almost exactly between that of the
two conditions from Experiment 1 (target first: 56.5%, distractor
first: 63.7%). Neither the difference between Experiment 2 and the
target-first condition, F(1,40)= 2.09, p= 0.16, nor the difference
between Experiment 2 and the distractor-first condition reached
significance, F(1,40) = 1.40, p = 0.24. This suggests that target
duration alone cannot explain our results.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study investigated whether task confusions in task
switching are due to failures in endogenous or exogenous
control, respectively. As an indicator of the frequency of task
confusions, the proportion of distractor errors relative to all
errors in a three-choice paradigm was used. In Experiment 1, the
efficiency of exogenous control was manipulated by varying the
temporal order of target and distractor. When the distractor was
presented prior to the target, the error rate was increased and
this increase was mainly due to an increased number of distractor
errors. Accordingly, reducing the efficiency of exogenous control
increased the susceptibility of task confusions. In Experiment
2, the efficiency of endogenous control was manipulated by
varying the time available for preparing the task in advance.
When only 100 ms of preparation time was available, the
error rate was strongly increased on task-switch trials. However,
the proportion of distractor errors remained the same in this
condition. Accordingly, reducing the efficiency of endogenous
control did not increase the susceptibility to task confusions.
The finding that only exogenous control affected the frequency
of task confusions has a number of implications regarding the
nature of errors resulting from task confusions as well as the
control processes that could prevent them: First of all, task
confusions emerge because the stimulus activates the irrelevant
task (see also Yamaguchi and Proctor, 2011), and therefore, are
related to stimulus-induced task conflicts that were shown to
prolong RTs on bivalent stimuli relative to univalent stimuli
(Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Waszak et al., 2003; Steinhauser and
Hübner, 2007, 2009). Because of this, errors due to task confusions
correspond to, what has been called, capture errors (e.g., Norman,
1981), which are errors resulting when behavior is controlled
by stimuli instead of internal goals. The pathologically increased
frequency of capture errors due to frontal brain lesions is called
utilization behavior (Lhermitte, 1983), and the present results
suggest that task confusions could be a viable measure of this
pathological behavior.
The finding that preparation time has no effect on the
frequency of task confusions seems to contradict the results of
Meiran and Daichman (2005). However, they observed such an
effect under conditions where each task was associated with one
hand, that is, when task confusionswere considered to be the same
as hand confusions. Therefore, their results could reflect the fact
thatmotor preparation of the relevant hand is susceptible to failure
when preparation time is short. Accordingly, these errors could
have emerged because the correct task was performed with the
wrong hand. In their second experiment, Meiran and Daichman
(2005) came to a similar conclusion by applying multinomial
modeling to a paradigm with overlapping response sets. The best
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fit was provided by a model that implied that task confusions
but not response confusions are affected by preparation time.
However, the results of multinomial modeling strongly depend on
which models are compared. For instance, no model was tested
that corresponded to the results of the present study. Such a
model would assume that preparation time affected the rate of
response confusions but not the rate of task confusions. Thus, it is
unclear whether the present results contradict the empirical data
of Meiran and Daichman (2005), or whether they only contradict
their model.
The present findings also seem to contradict theories that
attribute task confusions to a failure in establishing the correct
task set. For instance, the model of Altmann and Gray (2008)
assumes task confusions to be increased on task-switch trialswhen
preparation time is short. The present results rather suggest that
additional errors under these conditions are due to an increased
susceptibility to response confusions. This could imply that error
switch costs reflect a similar mechanism as RT switch costs, that
is, a more difficult response selection due to more interference
or a less prepared task set. However, our data mainly showed
that the susceptibility to task confusions is independent from
the efficiency of endogenous preparation (Meiran et al., 2002).
Whereas it is still possible that task confusions are related to a
failed preparation processes, they seem to be largely unaffected by
preparation time. This conclusion receives further support from
recent studies showing that also the task congruency effect, an
index of conflict between tasks, is independent of preparation time
(e.g., Yamaguchi and Proctor, 2011; Schneider, 2015).
Further implications of the present results concern the control
processes that can prevent task confusions. If task confusions
emerge because an irrelevant stimulus element activates a task,
selective attention should be a viable means to prevent task
confusions. This suggests that task confusions should be less
frequent under conditions that allow for a more efficient visual
selective attention. Indeed, Steinhauser and Hübner (2009) found
that stimulus-induced task conflicts are reduced when spatial
selective attention can be applied to select the relevant stimulus
feature. This also supports the idea that a main function of task-
set reconfiguration consists in configuring the attentional set
(Meiran, 2000; Meiran et al., 2008).
Finally, our results also indicate that errors due to task
confusions are less detectable than errors due to response
confusions. This makes sense in the light of current theories of
error detection. For instance, Yeung et al. (2004) proposed that
error detection is based on the detection of a post-error response
conflict that emerges between the still activated error response and
the later activated correct response. Similarly, Steinhauser et al.
(2008) suggested that error detection is based on the detection
of an internal error correction which occurs when the correct
response exceeds the response threshold after the error response
(see also, Rabbitt and Vyas, 1981). Despite the differences, both
theories assume that the efficiency of error detection depends
on how strongly the correct response becomes activated after an
error. This could explain why errors due to task confusions are
more difficult to detect. The correct response can only become
activated after an error when the correct task set is activated.
When an error occurs because of a task confusion, then the wrong
task set is activated at the time of the error. Detection of this
error requires that the system eventually succeeds in activating the
correct task set. Since this should fail with a certain probability,
error detection is less likely for errors due to task confusions than
for errors due to response confusion.
Taken together, the results of the present study suggest that
failures of exogenous control are the primary source of task
confusions emerging when participants rapidly switch between
tasks that share the same stimuli and responses. Under these
conditions, task confusions occur when the correct task set is
prepared but the wrong task set is activated by the stimulus. In
contrast, the efficiency of endogenous control seems to play a
minor role only.
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